ChinainAfrica

Taking place under the theme ‘Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future,’ the four-day event began yesterday in Istanbul. This first summit meeting is intended to allow the leaders of both sides to take stock of the progress made in various areas of development cooperation and look at the future of their relations with a view to further developing and diversifying them.

In an earlier post I noted the benefits such partnership may boast for Turkey, the most obvious being access to resources. Not surprisingly, the country is now eager to sign cooperation accords with Angola where oil reserves are around the 20 billion barrel mark. Sudan’s president Bashir is also in attendance at the Summit, likely for similar reasons.

The trade volume between Turkey and the continent allegedly rose by 140% between 2003 and 2007, and 55% in the first half of 2008. 

Turkey has declared 2008 as ‘Africa’s Year.’ Africa also had a “year” in 2006, which belonged to the Chinese, and another in 2007 which was claimed by the Indians. At this rate I’m curious to see who will claim the continent come 2009.

A report in The Voice of America notes that Georgia has asked China to use its influence to push for a resolution to a territorial flare-up with Russia. According to the report, Georgia’s ambassador to China, Zaza Begashvili, made no comments on the Chinese response, but remains optimistic that:

as a member of the U.N. Security Council, [China] will express its opposition to this aggression against an independent state

As the WSJ’s Gerald Seib notes, it probably isn’t feasible to try to play China and Russia directly off against each other, as was sometimes possible when they were the two Communist behemoths during the Cold War. Nonetheless, I’m curious to see what China will do in this situation. Let’s consider the two most obvious options:

Option 1: China does not assist Georgia 

The likelier option if you ask me. As a still emerging power China is heavily dependent on its strategic partnership with Russia and isn’t about to make any move that would place that partnership in jeopardy. Furthermore, if China intends to stick to its policy of “non-interference” (which, if one considers China’s activities of the past five or so years, appears to be debunk regardless), interfering in the conflict becomes even more unlikely. While China may express its concern verbally, we all know that actions speak louder than words.

Option 2: China assists Georgia

I’m still trying to play this one out in my head, so bear with me. At present I can think of only two conditions under which any such thing would be likely. The first is China’s image in the international community, especially now during the Olympics. Then again, if China was concerned with its image, I doubt the country would be complicit in the Darfur and Zimbabwean crises, among others. Nor would it bear such an atrocious human rights record with respect to its own people. Right. Condition #1 scratched. 

Condition #2: Oil. The WSJ again reports that the conflict in Georgia is placing grave doubt on the country’s reliability as an energy corridor bringing Caspian crude to global oil markets, and sending shockwaves through the world-wide supply chain. Indeed only today BP shut down a pipeline over security fears in Georgia. It’s no secret that China is resource hungry, pursuing oil wherever it can get its hands on it. If the Chinese are to intervene (and that’s a big “if”) then I speculate that their only reason for doing so would be over oil. Indeed, China and Georgia maintain friendly relations and I doubt China would want to lose a potential oil resource. Then again, much depends on China’s relations with other key players like Iran and various African states like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan from which China derives most of its oil.

The Doha round of trade talks has ended without producing anything in the way of an agreement. Talks finally broke down after failing to reach a compromise over agricultural import rules. The FT provides details.

Yet unlike those who are now beginning to speak of “collapse,” this writer wouldn’t go so far as to claim that nothing productive has resulted from the week-long affair. Conversely, I’d argue that the WTO’s failure signals important shifts in the international power structure, with some countries - China in particular - quickly rising in the ranks as a  powerful force in global trade wrangling. Indeed, much to everyone’s surprise China, together with India, took a prominent part in pressing for import safeguards to shield poor farmers. As Joseph Cheng, chairman of the Contemporary China Research Center at City University of Hong Kong, observes: “China intends to play a more active role as a Third World leader.”

The question of China’s rise prompts numerous questions, among them that of what this means for Africa. Indeed, many Africans walked away from the Doha talks frustrated that most of the key issues of interest to the African continent were not even discussed, especially the issue of cotton. With Chinese interests so deeply rooted in African soil, it will be interesting to observe the changing face of the international trade debate. I defer to the experts here to speculate on what we might expect.

Regardless, while Doha produced no formal agreements, I would like to proffer two:

1. It’s time to reevaluate the effectiveness of the WTO as a trade negotiation and dispute mechanism. A tried and tested critique, to be sure, but this most recent failure gives us more reason to pause.

2. China is becoming an international force to be reckoned with. And, by the look of things, perhaps faster than we thought.

According to an article in today’s Business Daily, a Kenyan-based newspaper, Turkey has become the latest emerging economy to join the scramble for African resources, with a continent-wide investment conference to be held in Istanbul in mid-August. 

Turkish focus appears targeted especially at Kenya; bilateral trade between the two countries capped at $90 million just last year. Indeed,  since the country’s 2007 presidential upheaval, Turkey has become one of the key source markets for Kenyan consumer goods such as textiles, carpets, furniture and electronics for the newly rich. In February 2007, an article in the Turkish Daily News touted the positive economic byproducts of Kenya’s “civil war” for the Turkish cut-flower industry. 

For a country like Turkey -  short on natural resources, desperately seeking admission to the EU and otherwise wanting to maintain and grow its economy - investing in Africa appears a sound business option. What I’m less certain of, however, is how this new phase of South-South cooperation will ultimately benefit the African continent. This is not to suggest that it necessarily won’t, but I can’t help but wonder: with China, Japan, India and now Turkey (as well as other developing countries - apologies to Japan for lumping it in this category) carving up the African continent, are we witnessing a new phase in productive economic partnerships, or a 21st century version of colonialism?

A link to a report which was adopted by the European Parliament on 23 April 2008, China’s policy and its effects in Africa. Note especially the sections on ’sustainable development’ and ‘trade, investment and infrastructures.’ 

First, sincerest apologies for the recent hiatus; graduate life has a way of catching up with you when you least expect - and/or desire! - it. Alas, much of the insanity has at least temporarily subsided and I hope to update this blog as regularly as possible.

During my blogging absence, my time was instead consumed by chapter deadlines and Research Network events. My colleagues and I hosted the first successful China-Africa Research Network lecture last week, with 55 people in attendance. Speaking with audience members both before and after the event made me increasingly aware of the growing salience of this issue, both for those engaged in international relations and those outside the discipline. Indeed, reactions to Chris Alden’s lecture ranged from fascination to horror (at the topic being discussed, not the lecture itself!), and many participants expressed great interest in wanting to discover more about the issue. 

In listening to the post-lecture chit-chat, however, I began to notice patterns in our discourse; patterns observed by Emma Mawdsley in her recent article. We speak often of China as the ‘villain’ and African states as the victims. We speak, generally, on the macro level, discussing issues such as China’s ‘resource grab’ and its relations with rogue states. We speak, too, of the negative ramifications of China’s engagement in Africa - its disastrous impact on local industries, its unwillingness to abide by international standards - and fail to acknowledge the ways in which it is aiding many states Western donors have been unable to reach. In all of this one can’t help but wonder whether our discourse guides our views of contemporary Sino-African relations, or vice-versa.

Moreover, among the many curious things about Sino-African relations today is that the surrounding rhetoric is neither Chinese nor African. While we occasionally hear of ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win’ cooperation (both are terms coined by the Chinese to characterize their relations with their African counterparts), the remaining rhetoric is Western. If we are to truly understand the content and character of Sino-African relations does it not make sense to loosen the grip of Western discourse and allow African and Chinese voices to surface? In our chatter we appear to be silencing those who have the most to say and whose voices ultimately matter most - a strategy that in the end benefits no one.

This evening I attended a fascinating lecture by Mr. Alex Vines of the Royal Chatham House on Africa’s growing strategic relevance for the West. Mr. Vines spoke particularly of US, UK and French interests.

Listening to him speak, I began to recall comments made by my Beijing colleagues with regard to their commercial activity in Africa. “We are not doing anything that Western powers haven’t already done,” they told me. A cursory examination of Western activities in Africa would suggest that they are, in large measure, right.

America’s major African allies are Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria - none of which have held credible elections in the past few years. The United States has also recently begun down-playing humanitarian causes in Africa to gain leverage against the growing powers of India and China. A foremost example of this is Equatorial Guinea. For the French, the Elf corruption scandal is a blemish on their African ventures, adding to the already existing Rwandan blemishes. The English, too, have had their share of underhanded activities across the continent.

What lies behind many - if not all - of these activities are the national interests of the respective Western powers. The need for oil, resources, and diplomatic allies drives most Western interests in Africa. Out of the countries here in question, only the English stand out for their particular dedication to humanitarian causes, though one must also be careful not to exaggerate the extent of this activity.

Given this history, then, why all the fuss about China? Yes, it is a Communist country; yes, the nature of Chinese business practices are altogether dubious and quite generally in violation of international standards; yes, the Chinese effectively sustain rogue states. We cannot, however, point a finger at China without wagging a finger or two at the West. This is not to forgive China for its sins (which are indeed many), but to suggest that the novelty surrounding contemporary Chinese activity in Africa is slightly exaggerated. Not only have the Chinese been engaged in similar activity elsewhere, but other powers have too.

Two wrongs certainly don’t make a right; and this, most certainly, isn’t the point I’m attempting to make. The point I am trying to make, however, is that at the end of the day strategy drives both Western and Chinese interest in Africa. At the end of the day, it’s the strategy, stupid.

A journalist colleague of mine, Ms. Dominique Patton, has for the past few months been covering Chinese business activity in Eastern Africa. Her most recent piece in Business Daily (based in Nairobi) discusses Kenya’s dwindling tourist figures since the 27 December election, and the drastic impact this is having on the Kenyan economy (approximately 59% of Kenya’s GDP is derived from the service sector, of which tourism forms a significant part).

While the Chinese tourist market is much smaller than the US or UK, it is nevertheless an important emerging market. Many Chinese tourists, too, are not tourists in the traditional sense but come to survey market opportunities; many end up staying and making significant investments in Kenya’s various industry sectors. 60% of Chinese tourists are, indeed, business travelers.

While general African concern regarding the Chinese speaks to there being ‘too many,’ it appears that Kenyan concerns may now be of there being ‘not enough.’ Amidst the plethora of mixed feelings regarding Chinese presence in the country - indeed in the continent - it appears that today the prospect of the Chinese leaving Kenya (or not even arriving) is a much more daunting prospect than their being there in the first place. It would appear that Africa needs China more than we (or at least I) may have imagined, and a new era of African dependency may be upon us.