ChinainAfrica

Against the wishes of those in Beijing who warn against awarding Chinese dissidents the Nobel Peace Prize, Hu Jia has found himself on this year’s shortlist. According to Forbes’ Tina Wang: 

Hu Jia has advocated, through political articles published online, in support of awareness of rural AIDS sufferers, democratic rights, religious freedom and Tibetan self-determination. He directs a U.S.-based organization that commemorates the “June Fourth Movement,” the protests in Tiananmen Square that resulted in the government crackdown of 1989. He also directs a health institute in Beijing and founded Loving Source, an AIDS nongovernmental organization.

The only other China-related honoree thus far is the Dalai Lama, who received the prize in 1989. The Nobel Committee’s choice of a Chinese activist would amount to a strong nod to critics of Beijing’s policies.

A front-page story of today’s International Herald Tribune reports that:

“Since the Olympic Village press center opened Friday, reporters have been unable to access scores of Web pages — among them those that discuss Tibetan issues, Taiwanese independence, the violent crackdown on the protests in Tiananmen Square and the Web sites of Amnesty International, the BBC’s Chinese-language news, Radio Free Asia and several Hong Kong newspapers known for their freewheeling political discourse”

As it turns out, earlier excitement over the ‘free reporting’ that was to allegedly occur during the Olympic Games was unwarranted: international journalists and spectators will be subject to the same blocks that China places on the Internet for its citizens. Fabulous.

Admittedly, I was among those who hoped the Olympics would open up the black-box that is China. Would, even in some small way, liberalize the country. From my time there and my correspondences with colleagues in Beijing and elsewhere, I’ve developed a distinct love of and fascination with the “awakened giant” and would like nothing more than for its citizens to enjoy the personal freedoms they rightly deserve. But, as more and more indiscretions surface, I can’t help but wonder if Anuradha Amrutesh from Bangalore, India was right: ”The Olympics should have never gone to China.”

A new twist on an old theory, indeed! A most interesting column in the Washington Post draws parallels between the sentiments borne out of China’s apparent ineptitude on the soccer field and those regarding China’s place at the world table. A passage for your tasting: 

“Our ongoing soccer misery highlights a basic paradox about today’s China. On the surface, we seem to be feeling pretty ebullient, with our fast-growing economy, our newfound wealth and our showcase Olympics, with its peppy theme of “One World, One Dream.” We’re confident that the future belongs to us. But on a deeper level, many Chinese — especially us men — are unhappy, deeply frustrated and prone to strong, deep-rooted pangs of helplessness and abandonment. And it’s all soccer’s fault.”

Whether or not it is, indeed, “soccer’s fault” I don’t know, but there is no denying this sense of mixed emotions among many Chinese. Indirectly, this column highlights much of what I have been saying all along: while China goes to great lengths to put on ‘face’ for the international community, locally inequality, poverty and continued frustrations persist.

The image of the new China Central Television building (below) built especially for the 2008 Olympics was yesterday’s most e-mailed image on Yahoo. 

The building, constructed by the Dutch architectural firms OMA and Arup, clearly breaks with the more traditionalist towers which point towards the sky. Here, instead, one has a continuous loop of horizontal and vertical sections that create their own space and, in a curious yet powerful way, create a distinct sense of energy; one can almost feel the electric currents surging through the building. 

Such a construction would, indeed, be an architectural accomplishment anywhere, but the fact that it has occurred in Beijing is particularly significant. As with all forms of postmodernist architecture, the new CCTV building poses challenges to the limits of modernism and, in turn, to those who hold to the notion of an under-developed China. As noted by a recent article in Vanity Fair, the entire Olympic construction project appears one big attempt to say to the industrialized world: “Whatever you can do, we can do better.” And fair enough. 

Beyond it’s architectural splendor, the fascinating thing about this seeming wave of postmodernism in China (if one can even go so far to call it that), lies in its connection to politics. There’s no denying that architecture has always been inseparable from politics in a broad sense. No less than, say, the Egyptian pyramids, Europe’s great Gothic cathedrals were conceived as expressions of power. Similarly, both Albert Speer’s grandiose design for Hitler’s Berlin and 1960’s efforts to bring social improvement through public housing were politically inspired. 

The recent surge of what I like to call “can-do” architecture in China likewise signals the rise of a powerful China - it’s impact on African politics and it’s relations with the US are enough to make this point clear. Yet within China itself, there appear to be minimal changes; many citizens are actually worse off than in years past. This contrast between the image of a rising China and that of a country struggling to resolve its own domestic problems raises a plethora of questions over whether Chinese politics will be able to match its architecture. As the saying goes, you can talk the talk, but can you walk the walk?  

According to a recent article in the Nigerian “This Day,” it appears that the Beijing Olympics may have several fewer Africans than expected.

According the the article, Chinese embassies in Nigeria and other African states are making it difficult for Africans - including heads of state and sports federation leaders- to obtain the necessary documentation to travel to China for the event. Applicants are required to present evidence of ticket purchases, accommodation arrangements, and other pieces of information that some do not yet have or are unable to prove through paperwork. 

If this is indeed the case, such actions, coupled with the 11 July Chinese veto of a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe put China in a rather curious position vis-a-vis its African colleagues. Especially in the eyes of ordinary Africans, China is increasingly assuming the role of villain. For many Zimbabweans, for instance, the outlook is now one of “us” versus “them,” where “them” means Mugabe and his Chinese cronies. 

When China first won the bid for the Olympics, there was much enthusiasm that the games would begin to change the face of Chinese policies. As the Telegraph’s Richard Spencer observes, there is little sign of it so far.

In case you missed it (as I initially did!) FastCompany has an interesting six-part series on China in Africa, with focus on Mozambique, Zambia, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. The report has, as Chris Blattman notes in his post, an at times alarmist tone referring, for example, to Chinese resource extraction as the “Great Chinese Takeout.” An interesting perspective, to be sure.

Curious phrases aside, the report offers much valuable information. Particularly in its analysis of the Zambian case (the country with which I’m most familiar) it aptly describes China’s role in Zambia’s mining industry, its labor ’standards,’ access to credit and linkages with the Chinese government. Moreover, it presents quite remarkable bits of data such as these:

For those who previously questioned the significance of China’s entry into Africa, these graphs alone should be enough to allay their doubts. What remains to be yet determined, however, is what exactly all this means for African economies. While the report goes a long way in describing the ‘what’ element of China in Africa it falls short of addressing the ‘why’ and ‘how.’ Nevertheless, the series makes for a good read and presents much useful information. I highly recommend it.

In June 2008, the New York based International Crisis Group released a report entitled “China’s Thirst for Oil.” The report does a wonderful job outlining China’s general resource objectives and examining its impact on two conflict cases - Sudan and Iran. 

A copy of this report can be downloaded here.

“Conquer English to make China stronger!!” is the slogan of Li Yang’s Crazy English course in Beijing, part of the country’s program to teach itself as much English as possible before the start of the Olympics this August. 

Li’s classes - held often in large arenas and auditoriums in a way analogous to American megachurches - attract large followings, making him a sort of “Elvis of English” for many Chinese. Some followers even go so far as to donate blood just to be able to attend his lectures, while others faint in the crowds as if at a Beatles concert. Whether these ardent fans are actually learning English remains unclear.

What is clear, however, is that this “crazy English” program is one of the few instances of visible populism in China since the Cultural Revolution. Having taught himself English - and in China, no less -  Li exemplifies the possibilities available to common Chinese citizens and, perhaps even more the the CCP itself, is a mobilizing agent for the country’s move towards modernization.

Whether Li’s courses have anything to do with the CCP is unknown (at least to this writer), though I’d be surprised if some links didn’t exist. Li does not claim to love the West, and instead describes it as an imperialist power set on infiltrating China with its customs and culture. His insistence on English is thus derived from a recognized need to close the gap between English-speaking and non-English speaking countries, rather than from any particular affinity towards all things Western.

More than an English course, Crazy English appears to be a way of liberating millions of Chinese from centuries of cultural indoctrination and making available to them a world beyond their own. As noted in a post on Ampontan: 

“Calling the program Crazy English is a stroke of genius. It provides the students with the justification for liberating themselves from centuries of cultural conditioning that expected people to be reserved and act within a group context instead of being openly assertive as individuals. Crazy people get to do anything they want.”

And what many Chinese want, it seems, is to be modern citizens in a modern-day world. Luckily for the CCP, this is what it wants of its citizens, too.

Today’s online issue of The Guardian had a rather interesting article on China’s role in Darfur. In it, Patrick Smith argues that if we are to point fingers at the Chinese for their failings in Darfur, we should equally point fingers at Russia and the West. 

While the argument itself lacks any sort of novelty, it touches on a point that is worth recalling. I certainly do not care to condone China’s Africa policy, as I find in it many faults, but I do think it behooves us to remember that the Chinese are not the only ones entangled with the Sudanese government. One need not look any further than France, Malaysia, Russia, and even the United States, to discover similar instances of government relations. Of course the nature of engagement of each state varies, but the point remains the same: they are all there. 

Last week Steven Spielberg withdrew as the artistic adviser to the upcoming Beijing Olympics on the grounds that he could not reconcile himself to aiding perpetrators of gross crimes against humanity (i.e. Darfur). According to Peter Apps, Spielberg’s snub is a sign of things to come. Spielberg’s decision is certainly noteworthy and a brilliant exercise of the kind of soft power that may ultimately impact on China’s Darfur policy, but to expect this to bring about such profound changes as many hope is to engage in nothing but wishful thinking. 

So long as other states continue to maintain relations with Khartoum - in whatever capacity - it is highly unlikely that the Chinese will make any significant changes to their Darfur - and indeed African - policy. In discussions with my Chinese colleagues, I continuously encounter two comments on the Darfur issue: (1) China is not doing anything that is not being done by other international actors; (2) There is a difference between business and government. The businessmen in Sudan do business, they do not engage in government activity. Whether or not they believe the latter is open to debate, but it is the former comment that is most salient.

The Olympics will go on without Spielberg, even without the assistance of others should they withdraw. Moreover, the Olympics will be the most fantastic spectacle of “East meets West” and “East doesn’t need/need to be like the West” propaganda the world has seen in some time. My brief visit to Beijing this past September convinced me of the fact.  If we follow Smith’s argument to it’s logical conclusion, however, it appears that the “Genocide Olympics” don’t belong to China alone. If we accept the international doctrine of responsibility, then to some extent the burden of the “Genocide Olympics” falls on all of us. In our failure to effectively aid the people of Darfur we are all in some measure responsible. Some, of course, more than others.

The 2008 Beijing Olympics will indubitably be a sensational display of “East meets West” and a showcase of just how advanced and “Western” is the PRC. In the run-up to the Olympics, taxi drivers are learning to speak English, citizens are being taught not to spit and now are also apparently being taught how to smile. The unknowing Westerner will be welcomed into a cultured, developed Chinese state and perhaps naively led to believe that Chinese communism isn’t so bad after all.

Yet upon reflection, the PRC’s modernization campaign is perhaps the most pervasive of all types of communism: not only does it interfere with an individual’s personal belongings, for instance, but also tells him or her how to feel and behave. Smile now. Don’t spit. Sit up straight. What’s worse is that citizens  incur fines if they are caught doing or not doing whatever it is the state tells them they ought or ought not to do. The PRC has become like a nagging mother whom it is impossible to shake. For all talk of progress, too, the recent modernization campaigns differ little from those of the 1950s (as documented in this 1950s anti-spitting video ) And that, I think, leaves little to smile about.