ChinainAfrica

In case you missed it (as I initially did!) FastCompany has an interesting six-part series on China in Africa, with focus on Mozambique, Zambia, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. The report has, as Chris Blattman notes in his post, an at times alarmist tone referring, for example, to Chinese resource extraction as the “Great Chinese Takeout.” An interesting perspective, to be sure.

Curious phrases aside, the report offers much valuable information. Particularly in its analysis of the Zambian case (the country with which I’m most familiar) it aptly describes China’s role in Zambia’s mining industry, its labor ’standards,’ access to credit and linkages with the Chinese government. Moreover, it presents quite remarkable bits of data such as these:

For those who previously questioned the significance of China’s entry into Africa, these graphs alone should be enough to allay their doubts. What remains to be yet determined, however, is what exactly all this means for African economies. While the report goes a long way in describing the ‘what’ element of China in Africa it falls short of addressing the ‘why’ and ‘how.’ Nevertheless, the series makes for a good read and presents much useful information. I highly recommend it.

A colleague recently forwarded me an interesting post appearing on Global Voices on the Chinese presence in Egypt:

“Knocks on the door. She told me in broken Arabic: “Wanna buy something Chinese?”

I would normally say: “No, thanks” to them and close the door … But this time my house was full of people so I asked her to come in.

She put the bag she was carrying with her on the floor and started to show me the goods she had. Tablecloths, cloths and cosmetics. I was looking at her, with a lot of questions inside me. Not about what she sold as it’s known since they started to invade the country by themselves rather than exporting their goods to us only. But what forced her to do such hard job, and travel away from her homeland with a backpack like a camel hump…”

The post goes on to observe that the Chinese are the only people who will go door to door, arriving in poor countries and selling poor goods. With an estimated 300 million poor in China, however, such desperate manifestations of capitalism are anything but surprising.

I have entered that phase enjoyed by every grad student where there is suddenly a light at the end of the tunnel. Albeit quite dim, I am beginning to see the end to my dissertation writing. Thank goodness! To be fair, I’m greatly enjoying this project of thesis writing, as it’s allowed me to immerse myself into the cultural and entrepreneurial practices of the overseas Chinese, and come to a greater understanding of issues of migration, identity, and small-scale entrepreneurism, among many others.

The chapter I’m currently working on is the framing chapter, attempting to situate Chinese migration to Africa in comparative perspective. It should come as no surprise that the Chinese are a widely dispersed group, with Chinatowns and ethnic enclaves all over the globe. This reality makes writing both easy and incredibly difficult. Writer’s block aside, I am coming to grasp the pervasiveness of Chinese migrant communities. Even where no Chinatowns analogous to those in San Francisco or NYC exist, the Chinese presence cannot - and has not - been ignored.

Such is the case in Paris, where the first French-Chinese man is running for mayor of Paris’ 13th district. About 20% of residents in the 13th arrondissement are of Asian origin, representing some 30, 000 people. Nationwide, there are an estimated half-million people of Asian decent. Paris’ Chinatown is the biggest in all of Europe.

The 37 year-old Wu is seemingly running on a platform of “let the Asians be seen,” calling in part for the building of Chinese gates similar to those that adorn Chinatown in San Francisco, such that “a visitor should know he is in Chinatown.” Charming though this concern may be, my hunch is that delimiting Chinatown for Parisian tourists is about as far down the list of concerns as one can get. In a country of increasing multiculturalism the primary concern is with the persistence of the Asian identity and the maintenance of closely formed networked communities.

While fancy gates and overt signs of “Chineseness” aren’t particularly necessary to accomplish such ends, they surely never hurt. Like many immigrant communities, the Chinese carry with them a strong sense of identity. Many continue to reside among their own people, with only minimal contact with the host society. They partake in cultural associations - recreational, political and/or cultural - which are often linked to organizations in Mainland China, and maintain close ties with family and friends in China. Such activities are typical of many overseas migrants, but are particularly unique among the Chinese in that they persist beyond the initial stages of migration.

In the Bay Area in California, for instance, many signs over banks, restaurants and other public services are now in Mandarin and English - this, in areas outside of San Francisco’s Chinatown. The Chinese initially arrived in California in the 1850s and have held on to their identity since. Similar patterns can be observed across much of North America and Europe. France is the latest case in point.

Why do I bring this up? While it’s far too early to speak of such developments in the African context, the Parisian case suggests that the Chinese presence in Africa may in the long-term alter the continent’s identity and politics. The establishment of China City in Joburg, South Africa, is perhaps the first step en route to this reality. I am not here laying any normative claims on such developments, but am merely bringing them to the attention of those to whom this is of interest. The possibility of ‘Chinatown, Africa’ is yet another among many considerations in the puzzle that is China-in-Africa.

A journalist colleague of mine, Ms. Dominique Patton, has for the past few months been covering Chinese business activity in Eastern Africa. Her most recent piece in Business Daily (based in Nairobi) discusses Kenya’s dwindling tourist figures since the 27 December election, and the drastic impact this is having on the Kenyan economy (approximately 59% of Kenya’s GDP is derived from the service sector, of which tourism forms a significant part).

While the Chinese tourist market is much smaller than the US or UK, it is nevertheless an important emerging market. Many Chinese tourists, too, are not tourists in the traditional sense but come to survey market opportunities; many end up staying and making significant investments in Kenya’s various industry sectors. 60% of Chinese tourists are, indeed, business travelers.

While general African concern regarding the Chinese speaks to there being ‘too many,’ it appears that Kenyan concerns may now be of there being ‘not enough.’ Amidst the plethora of mixed feelings regarding Chinese presence in the country - indeed in the continent - it appears that today the prospect of the Chinese leaving Kenya (or not even arriving) is a much more daunting prospect than their being there in the first place. It would appear that Africa needs China more than we (or at least I) may have imagined, and a new era of African dependency may be upon us.

Over the course of my research I’ve come to familiarize myself with Cape Verde - a tiny country off the western coast of Africa, and the focus of Jason DeParle’s brief multimedia in the NYTimes. Cape Verde has for a long time been the mecca of global migrants. While the flow of migration has generally been from the country, the reality is quickly beginning to reverse itself, particularly in the face of the new wave of Chinese migration.

In the past, Chinese overseas migration was largely driven by politics; today, business is the new watchword. The Chinese are chasing after oil, timber and other natural resources all across Africa. More than this, however, they are quickly establishing small-scale Chinatowns and setting up shops in countless city centers.

At the end of 2003, there were 27 Chinese shops in Sao Vincente, Cape Verde’s country’s second largest city; a five-fold increase since the mid-1990s. Each shops sells Chinese clothes, shoes, travel accessories, kitchenware and other knickknacks, and together these shops are driving out local businesses or forcing them to diversify the products they sell. Similar realities exist in Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria - indeed, all over the African continent.

Until recently, scholars of Sino-African relations have overlooked these micro-level encounters. Yet it is perhaps precisly here that our attention should be focused. My guess is that China’s resource grab isn’t going to last indefinitely, whereas Chinese shops and restaurants are seemingly here to stay. Cape Verde is just one case in point. Understanding the organization and business strategies of these small-scale businesses, as well as their relations with local society, may be a key to future development agendas and microfinance projects. It is, after all, at this lowest of levels that the true impact of ‘China in Africa’ is being felt.

My interest in Chinese migration led me to two articles recently published in the New York Times. In the first, Thomas Fuller tells us that cheap Chinese goods are improving livelihoods worldwide. Concerns over product safety such as those prevalent in the West are essentially moot in countries such as Laso, Cambodia and Vietnam where national purchasing power is generally low, and to own a cheap television or cooking utensil is alone a luxury.

This is true not only in Asia, but in Africa as well: cheap Chinese goods are infiltrating markets from Kenya to South Africa to Zimbabwe. While the quality of these goods is much like the price (low) and the ramifications on local industries remain somewhat dubious, there is an upside. Indeed, the influx of such goods is increasing the purchasing power of citizens all over Africa. More than that, it is connecting them to a world beyond their own. With Western and domestic products becoming increasingly too expensive, chances are high that cheap Chinese goods will continue to dominate markets across Asia and Africa - perhaps even long after citizens there will be able to afford something better.

Related to this phenomenon is a piece by Jason DeParle telling us that there are an estimated 74 million ’south-south’ migrants making the trek from “poorer to poor” countries. Though his article focuses primarily on the Dominican Republic, it speaks of a much wider phenomenon - one of which contemporary Sino-African relations form a significant part. Indeed, once one looks beyond China’s ‘oil-for-aid’ diplomacy and its pursuit of resources, the China-in-Africa phenomenon is analogous to what DeParle describes: Chinese migrants seeking jobs and better wages; some coming for seasonal work, and others putting down roots.

More than anything, we are witnessing Chinese globalization. The question is: are Africa and the world ready?