ChinainAfrica

A colleague of mine who works with the International Crisis Group based in Beijing recently sent me a copy of the contract between the DRC and China on exploitation of mines and construction of infrastructure. You can find a copy of this document here:  drc-chinese-contract (In French).

I also found the following links to be quite useful in shedding light on the DRC-China partnership:

IMF to study China’s Congo deal before any accord

China in DR Congo aid deal

China, Congo Trade For What the Other Wants (part of a great NPR five-part series on China’s rising power in Africa)

Hello all! First, I am most pleased to announce that I have finally emerged from the depths of dissertation writing and, as of yesterday afternoon, am more or less a free woman. This, I hope will translate to more consistent and frequent blog updates. Indeed, many developments have taken place during my absence. I surely cannot even so much as begin to do them all justice in this one entry, so I’ll begin with my personal favorite: the Chinese arms shipment to Zimbabwe.

Earlier this month, a shipment of ammunition, rockets and mortar bombs was denied access through South Africa. The weapons were en route to Zimbabwe, and it is believed that they would be used to crush the Zimbabwean opposition following the 29 March 2008 election. On 22 April Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu noted that the shipment is “normal” and that it is common in international trade to transport goods inland to African countries through the port in Durban, South Africa. 

So many questions can be asked of this one comment that it’s actually quite phenomenal. The first that comes to mind is: who in the Chinese government allows for such statements to be made? Anyone who has been tracking African politics in the past month or so can very quickly gauge that the uproar has little to do with the shipment’s entry point. It has to do with the shipment itself, and the political situation in its destination state. If nothing else, China’s position on the matter is indicative of a seeming ignorance of foreign affairs, which is quickly damaging China’s international standing.

But, of course, the Chinese are not ignorant and are well aware of the Zimbabwean plight. By continuing with business as usual they are likely trying to live up to their ‘non-interference’ policy, which has long fallen by the wayside. As Christopher Clapman observes in his new book (written together with Chris Alden and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira), “In the longer term, no external power with long-term interests in Africa can escape the issue of ‘governance’, because this is the essential precondition for maintaining stable economic relationships.” In case the Chinese haven’t yet reconciled themselves to this reality, it’s high time they do so - and fast. 

Indeed, there is much speculation over China’s motives behind such a shipment, at such a time. Some blame political alliances, enmeshed as they are in unthinkable levels of corruption. Others point to economics and international trade between the two countries. Yet no one, it seems, has the gall to suggest another, more likely, alternative: the Chinese simply don’t care. 

Despite their claims of foreign aid assistance, concern for human rights, etc., etc. there is very little proving that the Chinese actually have any interest in such matters. As in Darfur before, the Chinese are little concerned with assisting the people of Zimbabwe or helping to alleviate the situation. To the extent that any assistance will be given, it will be nothing more than a token gesture that will have little to no tangible impact. The arms deal with Zimbabwe is, above all else, profitable for the Chinese. Profit aside, little else matters. China isn’t going to be a hero for the African people. Not now, not ever. And with this recent arms shipment the proof, it seems, is in the pudding.

It’s a curious exercise to run through the list of countries recently noted to be making significant advancements in their trade with developing countries. This, as reported in a recent Asian Tribune article and a 2007 UN Report, “The State of South-South Cooperation” . China, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, South Africa, India — really, it’s a fantastic game of ‘what doesn’t belong.’

The correct response is of course China. China is the only non-DAC donor on the list, thus removed from various guidelines which bind the other parties. What this means in practice is that no one in the international community is really quite sure as to what’s behind Chinese aid, how it works, or how it fits into the bigger picture of foreign aid assistance. Much of my time at the UN was spent trying to discover this; yet the most I - or anyone - was able to conclude is that Chinese “aid” is not really “aid” in the traditional sense, but is tied to various kickbacks the government hopes to receive in return. What truly lies beneath it is at this point anyone’s guess.

The likelihood of China joining the DAC anytime soon is quite slim. At the same time, China continues to pump billions upon billions of dollars into various projects, most prominently in Africa. Just yesterday the China-Africa Development Fund signed its first batch of investment deals totaling $90 million. In the world of development aid this makes China an anomaly. While incorporating China into the DAC may presently not  be an option, the international community must find some way to rope China in - not only for monitoring purposes but also, and most importantly, to successfully coordinate and align development projects to ensure they attain their intended objectives.

The Chinese government recently released a statement saying that democracy hurts Kenya; this statement coming in light of recent post-election violence in the country. The irony of this statement is quite fantastic when one considers Chinese claims of “non-interference” in the domestic politics of African - and indeed all other - states.

Curiously, the Chinese appear to be doing anything but not interfering. Beijing continues to sustain despotic regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe; African states signing bilateral agreements with China are required to renounce their allegiance to Taiwan and support the “One China” policy (Malawi is a recent case in point); the 2006 Zambian election hinged on precisely the ‘China question,’ with Chinese officials threatening to cut diplomatic ties with the country if the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, was elected (he ultimately wasn’t); and now the Chinese are making pronouncements on the disadvantages of democracy in Kenya! Non-interference? Please. Who do the Chinese really think they’re fooling?

The BBC reported today that China is sending 5,000 metric tons of food aid to Zimbabwe to help the African nation cope with dire food shortages. According to the the UN World Food Programme, poor agricultural policies, a declining economy and a poor harvest in 2007 have left the African nation with a 1m ton shortfall.

Shunned by Western leaders and investors, Mugabe’s government has turned to Beijing to solve these problems. The two countries established amicable relations in the 1980s, when they both shared the same Marxist ideology, and have remained allies ever since. The bond, it would seem, is rooted in a common thinking, one that is based on regime security rather than human security.