ChinainAfrica

Decentralization has been a buzz word in the development world for quite a while, as it is believed that local governments are more accountable to their constituents than are centralized governments. This logic seems to be making a resurgence in Somalia, where Somali intellectuals and Western academics are pushing for a form of government that might be better suited to Somalia’s fluid, fragmented and decentralized society: rebuilding Somalia from the bottom-up.

It is called the building-block approach. The first blocks would be small governments at the lowest levels, in villages and towns. These would be stacked to form district and regional governments. The last step would be uniting the regional governments in a loose national federation that controlled, say, currency and the pirate-infested shoreline, but did not sideline local leaders.

While decentralization has certainly been proven effective in various African locales, it has likewise heralded in problems of resource deficiency, wasted resources and policy overlap. While decentralization may solve some of Somalia’s problems, it may equally exacerbate others.

According to an article in today’s Business Daily, a Kenyan-based newspaper, Turkey has become the latest emerging economy to join the scramble for African resources, with a continent-wide investment conference to be held in Istanbul in mid-August. 

Turkish focus appears targeted especially at Kenya; bilateral trade between the two countries capped at $90 million just last year. Indeed,  since the country’s 2007 presidential upheaval, Turkey has become one of the key source markets for Kenyan consumer goods such as textiles, carpets, furniture and electronics for the newly rich. In February 2007, an article in the Turkish Daily News touted the positive economic byproducts of Kenya’s “civil war” for the Turkish cut-flower industry. 

For a country like Turkey -  short on natural resources, desperately seeking admission to the EU and otherwise wanting to maintain and grow its economy - investing in Africa appears a sound business option. What I’m less certain of, however, is how this new phase of South-South cooperation will ultimately benefit the African continent. This is not to suggest that it necessarily won’t, but I can’t help but wonder: with China, Japan, India and now Turkey (as well as other developing countries - apologies to Japan for lumping it in this category) carving up the African continent, are we witnessing a new phase in productive economic partnerships, or a 21st century version of colonialism?

According to a recent article in the Nigerian “This Day,” it appears that the Beijing Olympics may have several fewer Africans than expected.

According the the article, Chinese embassies in Nigeria and other African states are making it difficult for Africans - including heads of state and sports federation leaders- to obtain the necessary documentation to travel to China for the event. Applicants are required to present evidence of ticket purchases, accommodation arrangements, and other pieces of information that some do not yet have or are unable to prove through paperwork. 

If this is indeed the case, such actions, coupled with the 11 July Chinese veto of a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe put China in a rather curious position vis-a-vis its African colleagues. Especially in the eyes of ordinary Africans, China is increasingly assuming the role of villain. For many Zimbabweans, for instance, the outlook is now one of “us” versus “them,” where “them” means Mugabe and his Chinese cronies. 

When China first won the bid for the Olympics, there was much enthusiasm that the games would begin to change the face of Chinese policies. As the Telegraph’s Richard Spencer observes, there is little sign of it so far.

In case you missed it (as I initially did!) FastCompany has an interesting six-part series on China in Africa, with focus on Mozambique, Zambia, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. The report has, as Chris Blattman notes in his post, an at times alarmist tone referring, for example, to Chinese resource extraction as the “Great Chinese Takeout.” An interesting perspective, to be sure.

Curious phrases aside, the report offers much valuable information. Particularly in its analysis of the Zambian case (the country with which I’m most familiar) it aptly describes China’s role in Zambia’s mining industry, its labor ’standards,’ access to credit and linkages with the Chinese government. Moreover, it presents quite remarkable bits of data such as these:

For those who previously questioned the significance of China’s entry into Africa, these graphs alone should be enough to allay their doubts. What remains to be yet determined, however, is what exactly all this means for African economies. While the report goes a long way in describing the ‘what’ element of China in Africa it falls short of addressing the ‘why’ and ‘how.’ Nevertheless, the series makes for a good read and presents much useful information. I highly recommend it.

The Chinese government recently released a statement saying that democracy hurts Kenya; this statement coming in light of recent post-election violence in the country. The irony of this statement is quite fantastic when one considers Chinese claims of “non-interference” in the domestic politics of African - and indeed all other - states.

Curiously, the Chinese appear to be doing anything but not interfering. Beijing continues to sustain despotic regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe; African states signing bilateral agreements with China are required to renounce their allegiance to Taiwan and support the “One China” policy (Malawi is a recent case in point); the 2006 Zambian election hinged on precisely the ‘China question,’ with Chinese officials threatening to cut diplomatic ties with the country if the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, was elected (he ultimately wasn’t); and now the Chinese are making pronouncements on the disadvantages of democracy in Kenya! Non-interference? Please. Who do the Chinese really think they’re fooling?

Until recently, Kenya was one of the hopeful stories for activists seeking to advance democracy on the African continent. But now, the horrid death toll of nearly 300 people, accounts of church burnings and Kikuyus being hacked apart by angry members of other tribes evoke memories of Rwanda and Zimbabwe’s rapid democratic decline. The UN cited Kenyan police as saying 70,000 people have been displaced during the five days of violence, may fleeing to neighboring Uganda and some to Tanzania. Clinics around Nairobi and Eldoret are reported to be running out of basic materials such as gauze, and many of the country’s citizens remain without food and shelter. As democracy hangs by a thread in Kenya, the world helps, watches and waits.

There are many lenses through which one can examine the Kenyan crisis. For the United States, for instance, Kenya has been what the Wall Street Journal notes is a key regional ally on counterterrorism. Instability in Kenya thus has repercussions for the entire international community. For the African continent, the crisis brings much deeper social, economic and developmental implications. For the Chinese, too, Kenya’s democratic crisis hits at the heart of Beijing’s strategic interests.

Between 2004-2007 Kenya and China signed 12 bilateral accords covering a variety of fields including the economy, technology, energy, tourism, health, aviation, the press, archeology and education - many of which may be jeopardized in the face of Kenya’s electoral conflict. Furthermore, the Chinese view Kenya in terms of its strategic positioning and maintain it is the best-placed entry point into Eastern and Central Africa.

Yet if Kenya is indeed as central to Chinese interests as they maintain, then one cannot help but wonder: where are they? In some respects, the conflict in Kenya is an opportunity for Beijing to rectify its international image vis-a-vis its activity in Darfur and present itself as a defender of human rights and a source of international aid. In November 2007 China offered to help modernize Kenya’s military, noting that the support would not only improve the military’s ability to ensure security along the borders but also enhance Kenya’s role in peace-keeping activities in Africa and beyond. It would seem that such capabilities are necessary now more than ever.

This is not to suggest that the Chinese assume a central role in what truly is a heartbreaking conflict; quite the opposite. What is being suggested is that China has an opportunity to assist a floundering state - one which has been its diplomatic ally for over 40 years. While Beijing should stay out of Kenya’s politics it can, and should, assist the country’s citizens to the best of it’s ability.