ChinainAfrica

The China-Africa Research Network cordially invites you to a lecture by Dr. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira:

‘Making Sense of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa’

5.00pm, Wednesday, 27 February Seminar Rm. 2, Queen Elizabeth House, 3 Mansfield Road

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira is a University Lecturer in Comparative Politics (African Politics) at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin. Prior to assuming his post in Oxford in September 2007, he was the Austin Robinson Research Fellow at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge and an Associate of the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge. He has also held research positions at the Sciences-Po in Paris and at the Centre of International and Area Studies at Yale.

Dr. Soares de Oliveira has worked in the field of governance and the energy sector for the World Bank, the European Commission and the French Ministry of Defense, among others. His recent work focuses on the issue of oil and governance in the Gulf of Guinea, where he has conducted extensive research. He is the author of Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea, co-editor of China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace and a contributing author to Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor.

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Please send any queries to: aleksandra.gadzala@merton.ox.ac.uk

Today’s online issue of The Guardian had a rather interesting article on China’s role in Darfur. In it, Patrick Smith argues that if we are to point fingers at the Chinese for their failings in Darfur, we should equally point fingers at Russia and the West. 

While the argument itself lacks any sort of novelty, it touches on a point that is worth recalling. I certainly do not care to condone China’s Africa policy, as I find in it many faults, but I do think it behooves us to remember that the Chinese are not the only ones entangled with the Sudanese government. One need not look any further than France, Malaysia, Russia, and even the United States, to discover similar instances of government relations. Of course the nature of engagement of each state varies, but the point remains the same: they are all there. 

Last week Steven Spielberg withdrew as the artistic adviser to the upcoming Beijing Olympics on the grounds that he could not reconcile himself to aiding perpetrators of gross crimes against humanity (i.e. Darfur). According to Peter Apps, Spielberg’s snub is a sign of things to come. Spielberg’s decision is certainly noteworthy and a brilliant exercise of the kind of soft power that may ultimately impact on China’s Darfur policy, but to expect this to bring about such profound changes as many hope is to engage in nothing but wishful thinking. 

So long as other states continue to maintain relations with Khartoum - in whatever capacity - it is highly unlikely that the Chinese will make any significant changes to their Darfur - and indeed African - policy. In discussions with my Chinese colleagues, I continuously encounter two comments on the Darfur issue: (1) China is not doing anything that is not being done by other international actors; (2) There is a difference between business and government. The businessmen in Sudan do business, they do not engage in government activity. Whether or not they believe the latter is open to debate, but it is the former comment that is most salient.

The Olympics will go on without Spielberg, even without the assistance of others should they withdraw. Moreover, the Olympics will be the most fantastic spectacle of “East meets West” and “East doesn’t need/need to be like the West” propaganda the world has seen in some time. My brief visit to Beijing this past September convinced me of the fact.  If we follow Smith’s argument to it’s logical conclusion, however, it appears that the “Genocide Olympics” don’t belong to China alone. If we accept the international doctrine of responsibility, then to some extent the burden of the “Genocide Olympics” falls on all of us. In our failure to effectively aid the people of Darfur we are all in some measure responsible. Some, of course, more than others.

First, sincerest apologies for the recent hiatus; graduate life has a way of catching up with you when you least expect - and/or desire! - it. Alas, much of the insanity has at least temporarily subsided and I hope to update this blog as regularly as possible.

During my blogging absence, my time was instead consumed by chapter deadlines and Research Network events. My colleagues and I hosted the first successful China-Africa Research Network lecture last week, with 55 people in attendance. Speaking with audience members both before and after the event made me increasingly aware of the growing salience of this issue, both for those engaged in international relations and those outside the discipline. Indeed, reactions to Chris Alden’s lecture ranged from fascination to horror (at the topic being discussed, not the lecture itself!), and many participants expressed great interest in wanting to discover more about the issue. 

In listening to the post-lecture chit-chat, however, I began to notice patterns in our discourse; patterns observed by Emma Mawdsley in her recent article. We speak often of China as the ‘villain’ and African states as the victims. We speak, generally, on the macro level, discussing issues such as China’s ‘resource grab’ and its relations with rogue states. We speak, too, of the negative ramifications of China’s engagement in Africa - its disastrous impact on local industries, its unwillingness to abide by international standards - and fail to acknowledge the ways in which it is aiding many states Western donors have been unable to reach. In all of this one can’t help but wonder whether our discourse guides our views of contemporary Sino-African relations, or vice-versa.

Moreover, among the many curious things about Sino-African relations today is that the surrounding rhetoric is neither Chinese nor African. While we occasionally hear of ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win’ cooperation (both are terms coined by the Chinese to characterize their relations with their African counterparts), the remaining rhetoric is Western. If we are to truly understand the content and character of Sino-African relations does it not make sense to loosen the grip of Western discourse and allow African and Chinese voices to surface? In our chatter we appear to be silencing those who have the most to say and whose voices ultimately matter most - a strategy that in the end benefits no one.