ChinainAfrica

The China-Africa Research Network cordially invites you to its inaugural lecture, to be delivered by Dr. Chris Alden of the London School of Economics:

‘China in Africa - Partner, Competitor or Hegemon? ‘
5.30pm, Tuesday, 5 February
Seminar Rm. 1, Queen Elizabeth House, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford

Reception and drinks to follow.

Chris Alden is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the LSE. He has researched and published on Asian-African relations for over fifteen years, and has previously taught at the University of Witwatersrand, the University of Tokyo, the Ecole Normale Superieure and the University of Cambridge.

Dr. Alden will speak on the topic of his recently published book, China in Africa, which has received much acclaim in both academic and policy circles. In his work, Alden investigates the emerging relationship between China and Africa to determine whether Beijing’s multi-billion dollar investments, the influx of Chinese merchants, labourers, and cheap consumer goods will result in effective Sino-African partnership, competition, or the rise of China as the new global hegemon. Alden argues that in order to understand Chinese involvement on the continent, we need to recognize the range of economic, diplomatic and security rationales behind Beijing’s Africa policy as well as the response of African elites and communities to China’s entreaties. Only then can the new challenges and opportunities for Africa and the West be accurately assessed.

Please send any queries to:
aleksandra.gadzala@merton.ox.ac.uk

This evening I attended a fascinating lecture by Mr. Alex Vines of the Royal Chatham House on Africa’s growing strategic relevance for the West. Mr. Vines spoke particularly of US, UK and French interests.

Listening to him speak, I began to recall comments made by my Beijing colleagues with regard to their commercial activity in Africa. “We are not doing anything that Western powers haven’t already done,” they told me. A cursory examination of Western activities in Africa would suggest that they are, in large measure, right.

America’s major African allies are Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria - none of which have held credible elections in the past few years. The United States has also recently begun down-playing humanitarian causes in Africa to gain leverage against the growing powers of India and China. A foremost example of this is Equatorial Guinea. For the French, the Elf corruption scandal is a blemish on their African ventures, adding to the already existing Rwandan blemishes. The English, too, have had their share of underhanded activities across the continent.

What lies behind many - if not all - of these activities are the national interests of the respective Western powers. The need for oil, resources, and diplomatic allies drives most Western interests in Africa. Out of the countries here in question, only the English stand out for their particular dedication to humanitarian causes, though one must also be careful not to exaggerate the extent of this activity.

Given this history, then, why all the fuss about China? Yes, it is a Communist country; yes, the nature of Chinese business practices are altogether dubious and quite generally in violation of international standards; yes, the Chinese effectively sustain rogue states. We cannot, however, point a finger at China without wagging a finger or two at the West. This is not to forgive China for its sins (which are indeed many), but to suggest that the novelty surrounding contemporary Chinese activity in Africa is slightly exaggerated. Not only have the Chinese been engaged in similar activity elsewhere, but other powers have too.

Two wrongs certainly don’t make a right; and this, most certainly, isn’t the point I’m attempting to make. The point I am trying to make, however, is that at the end of the day strategy drives both Western and Chinese interest in Africa. At the end of the day, it’s the strategy, stupid.

The 2008 Beijing Olympics will indubitably be a sensational display of “East meets West” and a showcase of just how advanced and “Western” is the PRC. In the run-up to the Olympics, taxi drivers are learning to speak English, citizens are being taught not to spit and now are also apparently being taught how to smile. The unknowing Westerner will be welcomed into a cultured, developed Chinese state and perhaps naively led to believe that Chinese communism isn’t so bad after all.

Yet upon reflection, the PRC’s modernization campaign is perhaps the most pervasive of all types of communism: not only does it interfere with an individual’s personal belongings, for instance, but also tells him or her how to feel and behave. Smile now. Don’t spit. Sit up straight. What’s worse is that citizens  incur fines if they are caught doing or not doing whatever it is the state tells them they ought or ought not to do. The PRC has become like a nagging mother whom it is impossible to shake. For all talk of progress, too, the recent modernization campaigns differ little from those of the 1950s (as documented in this 1950s anti-spitting video ) And that, I think, leaves little to smile about.

A journalist colleague of mine, Ms. Dominique Patton, has for the past few months been covering Chinese business activity in Eastern Africa. Her most recent piece in Business Daily (based in Nairobi) discusses Kenya’s dwindling tourist figures since the 27 December election, and the drastic impact this is having on the Kenyan economy (approximately 59% of Kenya’s GDP is derived from the service sector, of which tourism forms a significant part).

While the Chinese tourist market is much smaller than the US or UK, it is nevertheless an important emerging market. Many Chinese tourists, too, are not tourists in the traditional sense but come to survey market opportunities; many end up staying and making significant investments in Kenya’s various industry sectors. 60% of Chinese tourists are, indeed, business travelers.

While general African concern regarding the Chinese speaks to there being ‘too many,’ it appears that Kenyan concerns may now be of there being ‘not enough.’ Amidst the plethora of mixed feelings regarding Chinese presence in the country - indeed in the continent - it appears that today the prospect of the Chinese leaving Kenya (or not even arriving) is a much more daunting prospect than their being there in the first place. It would appear that Africa needs China more than we (or at least I) may have imagined, and a new era of African dependency may be upon us.

It’s a curious exercise to run through the list of countries recently noted to be making significant advancements in their trade with developing countries. This, as reported in a recent Asian Tribune article and a 2007 UN Report, “The State of South-South Cooperation” . China, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, South Africa, India — really, it’s a fantastic game of ‘what doesn’t belong.’

The correct response is of course China. China is the only non-DAC donor on the list, thus removed from various guidelines which bind the other parties. What this means in practice is that no one in the international community is really quite sure as to what’s behind Chinese aid, how it works, or how it fits into the bigger picture of foreign aid assistance. Much of my time at the UN was spent trying to discover this; yet the most I - or anyone - was able to conclude is that Chinese “aid” is not really “aid” in the traditional sense, but is tied to various kickbacks the government hopes to receive in return. What truly lies beneath it is at this point anyone’s guess.

The likelihood of China joining the DAC anytime soon is quite slim. At the same time, China continues to pump billions upon billions of dollars into various projects, most prominently in Africa. Just yesterday the China-Africa Development Fund signed its first batch of investment deals totaling $90 million. In the world of development aid this makes China an anomaly. While incorporating China into the DAC may presently not  be an option, the international community must find some way to rope China in - not only for monitoring purposes but also, and most importantly, to successfully coordinate and align development projects to ensure they attain their intended objectives.

The Chinese government recently released a statement saying that democracy hurts Kenya; this statement coming in light of recent post-election violence in the country. The irony of this statement is quite fantastic when one considers Chinese claims of “non-interference” in the domestic politics of African - and indeed all other - states.

Curiously, the Chinese appear to be doing anything but not interfering. Beijing continues to sustain despotic regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe; African states signing bilateral agreements with China are required to renounce their allegiance to Taiwan and support the “One China” policy (Malawi is a recent case in point); the 2006 Zambian election hinged on precisely the ‘China question,’ with Chinese officials threatening to cut diplomatic ties with the country if the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, was elected (he ultimately wasn’t); and now the Chinese are making pronouncements on the disadvantages of democracy in Kenya! Non-interference? Please. Who do the Chinese really think they’re fooling?

My colleagues and I often complain of the lack of information in contemporary Sino-African relations. China’s engagement in Africa is largely shrouded in secrecy with only those in top governmental or business positions keyed into the exact terms under which contracts are signed. Hard data on trade, investment, and the actual business dealings of Chinese firms is either incredibly difficult to come by or otherwise unreliable by virtue of being produced by the Chinese. Indeed African citizens and outsiders alike know very little about the actual reality of China’s dealings with Africa, in turn rendering prescriptions for effective cooperation difficult. Without accurate information only so much can be said.

Information. Information is what led Wei Wenhua, a 41-year old construction company executive, to be beaten to death by municipal inspectors in the central Chinese province of Hubei. Wenhua sought to expose a villager protest over municipal dumping near the villagers’ homes; the protest did eventually get the exposure he sought, but certainly not via the means he imagined. Wenhua was dead on arrival to Tianmen hospital.

As Westerners, it’s easy to at times forget the nature of the Chinese state. We hear much about the country’s incredible economic development, about prospects for democracy and the country’s modernization efforts. All are certainly deserving of applaud, though perhaps not as much as we are at times inclined to give. Incidents like Wenhua’s death make that point painstakingly clear. Despite all proclamations of advancement, China remains a Communist state — bringing with it all the baggage that comes with a Communist regime. While Chinese citizens certainly enjoy more information than those who lived under Soviet Communism, circumstances are not ideal. The word ‘information’ alone causes many within the CCP to cringe; citizens cannot have too much of it.

As researchers examining Sino-African relations it’s important to bear this in mind. The nature of China’s dealings in Africa are very much a reflection of domestic Chinese politics. Without understanding one, we cannot come to understand the other.

The recent edition of The Economist has a fantastic special report on global migration, emphasizing many points particularly salient to South-South population movements. Third World migration has for a long time been ignored, but is quickly making its way into the spotlight as scholars and policymakers alike begin to recognize its potential developmental impacts.

According to some statistics, approximately 80% of China’s inward FDI comes from its overseas migrants. Indeed, the PRC central and local governments place particular emphasis on the role of overseas Chinese in developing the country’s provinces. Similar policies apply in other developing countries, making the need to track and understand South-South migration that much more essential.

Over the course of my research I’ve come to familiarize myself with Cape Verde - a tiny country off the western coast of Africa, and the focus of Jason DeParle’s brief multimedia in the NYTimes. Cape Verde has for a long time been the mecca of global migrants. While the flow of migration has generally been from the country, the reality is quickly beginning to reverse itself, particularly in the face of the new wave of Chinese migration.

In the past, Chinese overseas migration was largely driven by politics; today, business is the new watchword. The Chinese are chasing after oil, timber and other natural resources all across Africa. More than this, however, they are quickly establishing small-scale Chinatowns and setting up shops in countless city centers.

At the end of 2003, there were 27 Chinese shops in Sao Vincente, Cape Verde’s country’s second largest city; a five-fold increase since the mid-1990s. Each shops sells Chinese clothes, shoes, travel accessories, kitchenware and other knickknacks, and together these shops are driving out local businesses or forcing them to diversify the products they sell. Similar realities exist in Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria - indeed, all over the African continent.

Until recently, scholars of Sino-African relations have overlooked these micro-level encounters. Yet it is perhaps precisly here that our attention should be focused. My guess is that China’s resource grab isn’t going to last indefinitely, whereas Chinese shops and restaurants are seemingly here to stay. Cape Verde is just one case in point. Understanding the organization and business strategies of these small-scale businesses, as well as their relations with local society, may be a key to future development agendas and microfinance projects. It is, after all, at this lowest of levels that the true impact of ‘China in Africa’ is being felt.

Africans and Western labor groups alike lament poor working conditions in Chinese firms operating in Africa. Many African employees work long hours, are paid well below the minimum wage, have no vacation days and often experience physical abuse from their Chinese managers. Without a doubt, conditions such as these are unacceptable and deserving of immediate attention and rectification.

Before we continue pointing fingers  and touting the cruelty of the Chinese in Africa, however, it’s worth considering what lies at the root of this problem. The answer, I think, is nothing more than a simple case of continuing the familiar, as documented in a recent NYTimes article. It is no mystery that labor conditions in China are anything but great. Employees in Chinese factories work long hours, are paid well below the minimum wage, have no vacation days and often experience physical abuse from their managers. Sound familiar?

While a change in labor conditions in Africa must certainly come, such change is direly needed in China as well. For until Chinese companies grant their own workers the rights they deserve, it is unlikely that these rights will be bestowed unto foreign nationals working in their firms.